This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Optimal redistribution with unobservable preferences for an observable merit good

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
RACIONERO, Maria del Mar

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper considers a government that seeks both to redistribute income and to encourage or discourage the consumption of a certain good. This good is assumed to be either a merit or demerit good. Individuals differ in their exogenous income and in their preferences for the merit good. The government can perfectly observe the level of consumption of the merit good. However, it cannot observe neither income nor preferences. The only observable variable is thus each individual's consumption of the merit good. In order to account for merit good considerations, we consider a modification of the utilitarian social welfare function in which the government imposes uniform preferences, despite the heterogeneous individual preferences, at a level which will depend on the merit or demerit nature of the observable good. We derive the optimal nonlinear redistributive policy and compare our results to the ones that would be obtained under a utilitarian social welfare function that respects the own preferences of individual.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.core.ucl.ac.be/services/psfiles/dp99/dp9909.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1999009.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 01 Feb 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1999009

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)
Phone: 32(10)474321
Fax: +32 10474301
Email:
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Alain GILLIS).

Related research
Keywords: merit goods; non-linear tax schedule.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Helmuth Cremer & Maurice Marchand & Pierre Pestieau, 1996. "Interregional redistribution through tax surcharge," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 157-173, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Atkinson, A. B. & Stiglitz, J. E., 1976. "The design of tax structure: Direct versus indirect taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1-2), pages 55-75. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. J. A. Mirrlees, 1976. "Optimal Tax Theory: A Synthesis," Working papers 176, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  4. Nichols, Albert L & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1982. "Targeting Transfers through Restrictions on Recipients," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 372-77, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 213-240, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Besley, Timothy, 1988. "A simple model for merit good arguments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 371-383, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. M. Fleurbaey & F. Maniquet, 1999. "Optimal income taxation : An ordinal approach," THEMA Working Papers 99-43, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1987. "Pareto efficient and optimal taxation and the new new welfare economics," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 991-1042 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ravi Kanbur & Jukka Pirttilä & Matti Tuomala, 2004. "Non-Welfarist Optimal Taxation and Behavioral Public Economics," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Sao-Wen Cheng & Andreas Wagener, 2000. "Altruism and Donations," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeitraege 92-00, Universität Siegen, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Citation analysis on IDEAS includes online papers that are freely accessible and whose text could be automatically analyzed, currently about 210000 papers.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-19.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.