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International treaties on global pollution: a dynamic time-path analysis

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  • CHANDER, Parkash

    (Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi, and the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore)

Abstract

In this paper we show that the formation of coalitions by subsets of countries might diminish the likelihood of a successful world-wide treaty on global pollution. Non-member countries may be less willing to sign a world-wide treaty than they would be in the absence of such coalitions. In fact, the coalition formation may raise the reservation utility of non-member countries above the world-wide treaty level and thus take away their incentives to sign it.

Suggested Citation

  • CHANDER, Parkash, 1998. "International treaties on global pollution: a dynamic time-path analysis," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1998054, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1998054
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-1064, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Parkash Chander, 2007. "The gamma-core and coalition formation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(4), pages 539-556, April.

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