In view of the well known core equivalence results in atomless economies, coincidence of market game equilibrium allocations with competitive allocations is tantamount to a three way equivalence between market game mechanisms, competitive equilibria and the core. Based on this idea I propose an equilibrium refinement of market games which allows me to use the core equivalence machinery to provide an exact market game characterization of competitive equilibria.
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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number
1998009.
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MERTENSÊ, Jean-Franois, 1996.
"The limit-price mechanism,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1996050, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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