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Imperfect Competition in an Overlapping Generations Model : A Case for Fiscal Policy

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  • d ASPREMONT, Claude

    ()
    (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)

  • DOS SANTOS FERREIRA, Rodolphe

    (BETA, Université Louis Pasteur, Strasbourg)

  • GERARD-VARET, Louis-André

    (GREQAM-UMR 9990 - CNRS - EHESS - Universités Aix-Marseille 2 et 3, Marseille)

Abstract

Imperfect competition is a meaningful feature for macroeconomic analysis only to the extent that is leads to properties qualitatively different from those obtained under perfect competition. In particular, we have to wonder how imperfect competition per se may find an alternative fiscal policy. For that matter we consider a simple overlapping generations model with firms acting as Cournot oligopolists in the good market. Through fiscal policy, a government, keeping the stock of money constant, retributes wealth amoung generations and absorb some of the output to provide public services. We show in this model that fiscal policy, by affecting firms’market power, can move the economy across perfect foresight stationary equilibria along a Pareto improving path, or that it can implement a full employment stationary equilibrium which Pareto-dominates underemployment equilibria

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1994077.

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Date of creation: 01 Dec 1994
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1994077

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Cited by:
  1. Peter Skott & Soon Ryoo, 2012. "Public Debt and Functional Finance in an OLG Model with Imperfect Competition," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2012-10, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
  2. Costa, Luís F. & Dixon, Huw David, 2011. "Fiscal policy under imperfect competition with flexible prices: An overview and survey," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, vol. 5(3), pages 1-57.

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