Unawareness : A Formal Theory of Unforeseen Contingencies. Part II
AbstractIn this paper we conclude the research initiated in Modica and Rustichini . We claim here, as we did in that paper, that simple uncertainty is not an adequate model of a subject's ignorance, because a major component of it is the inability to give a complete description of the states of the world, and we provide a formal model of unawareness. In Modica and Rustichini [6j we showed a difficulty in the project, in that without a weakening of the inference rules of the logic one would face the unpleasant alternative between full awareness and full unawareness. We give a formal definition of unawareness, we study a system of modal logic where non full awareness is possible, and prove that a satisfactory solution to the problem can be found by introducing limited reasoning ability of the subject.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1994004.
Date of creation: 00 1994
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:
- MODICA, Salvatore & RUSTICHINI, Aldo, 1993. "Unawareness : A Formal Theory of Unforeseen Contingencies. Part I," CORE Discussion Papers 1993036, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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