Monotonicity and the fair assignment solution
AbstractGiven any problem involving assignment of indivisible objects and a sum of money among individuals, there is a fair assignment (namely the minmax money assignment) which can be extended monotonically to a new fair assignment for any object added or person removed, and another (the maxmin value assignment) extendable similarly for any object removed or person added. This however is the extent of compatibility between fairness and monotonicity axioms in the assignment problem. No allocation other than the minmax money allocation is extendable. An analogue holds for the maxmin value allocation by example.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1992044.
Date of creation: 01 Jun 1992
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