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A model of strategic behaviour in repeated games

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  • BERGIN, James

Abstract

This paper develops a general repeated game model over arbitrary time domain (which includes continuous time behaviour). A player is committed at any point in time to history independent behaviour for a positive length of time. The length of time of commitment depends on the way the history evolves locally. A virtue of this approach is that none of the technical assumptions of the differential formulation (e.g. Lipschitz conditions) are required. In addition, the variable response strategy formulation allows a straightforward discussion of subgame perfection.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1990032.

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Date of creation: 01 Jan 1990
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1990032

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Cited by:
  1. Klein, Nicolas & Rady, Sven, 2008. "Negatively Correlated Bandits," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 243, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  2. Rida Laraki & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2003. "Continuous-time Games of Timing," Discussion Papers 1363, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Bergin, James & Duggan, John, 1999. "An Implementation-Theoretic Approach to Non-cooperative Foundations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 50-76, May.

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