The Economy-wide Impact of Better Governance: Cutting Informal Taxes in Indonesia
AbstractIn some developing economies the costs of meeting informal taxes (corruption of various sorts) have been put as high as 30 percent of the market value of output in some industries. Current political reform in Indonesia raises the prospect of a substantial fall in such costs. To assess the consequences for Indonesia's international competitiveness and national welfare requires the development and use of an applied general equilibrium model which explicitly recognises the existence of non-official imposts and the substantial (but socially wasteful) economic activity expended in attempting to reduce them. ORANI-RSA is such a model, recently developed for this purpose. In short- and long-run simulations the nominal rate at which informal taxes are levied is halved and the response of the economy determined. Not unexpectedly, competitiveness and the trade account improve substantially (with a 2 percent short-run fall in the real foreign-currency cost of the Rupiah). Indonesian welfare also improves. The only industry to decline is the service providing sector (corresponding roughly to the bureaucrats who supply intermediation between legitimate producers and the corrupt members of the power elite). The reform causes a fall in income from corruption, while redistributive effects via differential consumption patterns reinforce the improvement in the trade balance.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Victoria University, Centre of Policy Studies/IMPACT Centre in its series Centre of Policy Studies/IMPACT Centre Working Papers with number op-92.
Date of creation: Apr 1998
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- D58 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
- O53 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Asia including Middle East
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- Mark Horridge, 2000. "ORANI-G: A General Equilibrium Model of the Australian Economy," Centre of Policy Studies/IMPACT Centre Working Papers op-93, Victoria University, Centre of Policy Studies/IMPACT Centre.
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- Edimon Ginting, 1999. "Tax Evasion in a Corrupt Economy," Centre of Policy Studies/IMPACT Centre Working Papers g-133, Victoria University, Centre of Policy Studies/IMPACT Centre.
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