Political Particularism Around the World
AbstractAbstract: This paper presents a new data set on electoral systems and outlines its potential uses in further research exploring the connections between electoral systems and economic outcomes. The data set provides indicators of the degree to which individual politicians can further their careers by appealing to narrow geographic constituencies on the one hand, or party constituencies on the other.
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Date of creation: 01 May 2002
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- Jessica Seddon Wallack & Alejandro Gaviria & Ugo Panizza & Ernesto H. Stein, 2002. "Political Particularism around the World," IDB Publications 6494, Inter-American Development Bank.
- Jessica Seddon Wallack & Alejandro Gaviria & Ugo Panizza & Ernesto H. Stein, 2002. "Political Particularism around the World," Research Department Publications 4289, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
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