Decades back, a most prominent justice philosopher, John Rawls, put forth a clear definition of fairness in problems of social choice. Decision theory, which studies individual, and not social, choice has provided axiomatizations of decision rules in many settings, most prominently in settings where individuals face uncertainty (and not just risk). It turns out that there exists an analytical connection between these two branches of thought. This note exploits the aforementioned connection, by reading the social choice problem in terms of decision theory and (partially) exploiting the existing axiomatization. The purpose of the note is to obtain new and interesting questions more than it is to answer them, so it concludes by proposing a research problem.
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