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Comportamiento estratégico de los bancos centrales al anunciar pronósticos de inflación


Author Info

  • Sebastián Gómez Barrero


  • Julián Parra Polanía



El presente trabajo intenta cuestionar la idea, común en la literatura sobre transparencia, de que los anuncios de los bancos centrales son veraces per se. El documento presenta un modelo sencillo que ilustra el por qué el hacedor de política monetaria podría comportarse estratégicamente al publicar información. El análisis empírico de los pronósticos de inflación publicados por seis bancos centrales considerados muy transparentes, aunque preliminar, es consistente con las implicaciones del modelo y, por lo tanto, con la presencia de comportamiento estratégico en estos pronósticos.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA in its series BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA with number 008576.

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Length: 25
Date of creation: 03 May 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:col:000094:008576

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Keywords: Anuncios de bancos centrales; pronósticos de in?ación; política monetaria; transparencia.;

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Cited by:
  1. Julian A. Parra-Polania, 2012. "Transparency: can central banks commit to truthful communication?," BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA 009614, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA.


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