IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/005106.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A model of school behavior: tuition fees and grading standards

Author

Listed:
  • Dario Maldonado

Abstract

This paper uses a hybrid human capital / signaling model to study grading standards in schools when tuition fees are allowed. The paper analyzes the grading standard set by a profit maximizing school and compares it with the efficient one. The paper also studies grading standards when tuition fees have limits. When fees are regulated a profit maximizing school will set lower grading standards than when they are not regulated. Credit constraints of families also induce schools to lower their standards. Given that in the model presented competition is not feasible, these results show the importance of regulation of grading standards.

Suggested Citation

  • Dario Maldonado, 2008. "A model of school behavior: tuition fees and grading standards," Documentos de Trabajo 5106, Universidad del Rosario.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000092:005106
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstream/handle/10336/10950/5106.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. De Fraja, Gianni & Landeras, Pedro, 2006. "Could do better: The effectiveness of incentives and competition in schools," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 189-213, January.
    2. Betts, Julian R, 1998. "The Impact of Educational Standards on the Level and Distribution of Earnings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 266-275, March.
    3. Betts, Julian R. & Grogger, Jeff, 2003. "The impact of grading standards on student achievement, educational attainment, and entry-level earnings," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 343-352, August.
    4. Giorgio Brunello & Lorenzo Rocco, 2008. "Educational Standards in Private and Public Schools," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(533), pages 1866-1887, November.
    5. Costrell, Robert M, 1994. "A Simple Model of Educational Standards," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 956-971, September.
    6. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E, 1998. "Competition between Private and Public Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-Group Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 33-62, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Manna, Ester, 2013. "Mixed Duopoly with Motivated Teachers," MPRA Paper 52041, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Helmuth Cremer & Dario Maldonado, 2013. "Mixed oligopoly in education," Documentos de Trabajo 10500, Universidad del Rosario.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Giorgio Brunello & Lorenzo Rocco, 2008. "Educational Standards in Private and Public Schools," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(533), pages 1866-1887, November.
    2. M. De Paola & V. Scoppa, 2007. "Returns to skills, incentives to study and optimal educational standards," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 92(3), pages 229-262, December.
    3. Ozkan Eren & Daniel J. Henderson, 2008. "The impact of homework on student achievement," Econometrics Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 11(2), pages 326-348, July.
    4. Alessandro Tampieri, 2016. "Social background effects on school and job opportunities," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(5), pages 496-510, September.
    5. John Bishop & Ludger Wossmann, 2004. "Institutional Effects in a Simple Model of Educational Production," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(1), pages 17-38.
    6. Ludger Wößmann, 2006. "Bildungspolitische Lehren aus den internationalen Schülertests: Wettbewerb, Autonomie und externe Leistungsüberprüfung," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 7(3), pages 417-444, August.
    7. Gary-Bobo, Robert J. & Trannoy, Alain, 2005. "Efficient Tuition & Fees, Examinations and Subsidies," CEPR Discussion Papers 5011, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Figlio, David N. & Lucas, Maurice E., 2004. "Do high grading standards affect student performance?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(9-10), pages 1815-1834, August.
    9. Giorgio Brunello & Massimo Giannini, 2004. "Selective Schools," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(3), pages 207-225, July.
    10. Sevket Alper Koc & Hakki Cenk Erkin, 2015. "Standards, Inequality in Education and Efficiency," World Journal of Applied Economics, WERI-World Economic Research Institute, vol. 1(1), pages 21-43, June.
    11. Martin Gregor, 2021. "Electives Shopping, Grading Policies and Grading Competition," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 88(350), pages 364-398, April.
    12. Thomas Fuchs & Ludger Wößmann, 2008. "What accounts for international differences in student prformance? A re-examination using PISA data," Studies in Empirical Economics, in: Christian Dustmann & Bernd Fitzenberger & Stephen Machin (ed.), The Economics of Education and Training, pages 209-240, Springer.
    13. Stefano STAFFOLANI & Maria Cristina RECCHIONI, 2016. "Increasing Graduation and Calling for More Autonomy in Higher Education: Is It a Good Thing? A Theoretical Model," Working Papers 419, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    14. Betts, Julian R. & Grogger, Jeff, 2003. "The impact of grading standards on student achievement, educational attainment, and entry-level earnings," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 343-352, August.
    15. Friedhelm Pfeiffer & Henrik Winterhager, 2006. "Selektivität und direkte Wirkungen von Vermittlungsgutscheinen: Empirische Befunde aus der Einführungsphase," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 7(3), pages 395-415, August.
    16. Michael Kaganovich & Xuejuan Su, 2019. "College curriculum, diverging selectivity, and enrollment expansion," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 67(4), pages 1019-1050, June.
    17. Jalava, Nina & Joensen, Juanna Schrøter & Pellas, Elin, 2015. "Grades and rank: Impacts of non-financial incentives on test performance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 161-196.
    18. Su, Xuejuan, 2006. "Endogenous determination of public budget allocation across education stages," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 438-456, December.
    19. Grant, Darren, 2007. "Grades as information," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 201-214, April.
    20. Luis Fernando Gamboa & Mauricio Rodríguez-Acosta & Andrés Felipe García-Suaza, 2010. "Academic achievement in sciences: the role of preferences and educative assets," Documentos de Trabajo 6701, Universidad del Rosario.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:col:000092:005106. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Facultad de Economía (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ferosco.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.