IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/004382.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Characterization of Bidding Behavior in Multi-Unit

Author

Listed:
  • Luciano I. De Castro
  • Alvaro Riascos

Abstract

This paper provides first order conditions for a very general class of single or multi-unit auctions. Under mild conditions we characterize bidding-behavior and generalize previous standard results in the literature. As an application we obtain sufficient conditions for truth-telling, monotonic best reply strategies and identification results for multi-unit auctions.

Suggested Citation

  • Luciano I. De Castro & Alvaro Riascos, 2007. "Characterization of Bidding Behavior in Multi-Unit," Documentos CEDE 4382, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000089:004382
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstream/handle/1992/8179/dcede2007-26.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1997. "Game theory and empirical economics: The case of auction data 1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-35, January.
    2. Zheng, Charles Z., 2001. "High Bids and Broke Winners," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 129-171, September.
    3. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 1997. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 343-362, February.
    4. Araujo, Aloisio & de Castro, Luciano I., 2009. "Pure strategy equilibria of single and double auctions with interdependent values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 25-48, January.
    5. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2003. "Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 38-72, October.
    6. Robert Wilson, 1979. "Auctions of Shares," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 93(4), pages 675-689.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jorge Balat & Juan E. Carranza & Juan D. Martin, 2015. "Dynamic and Strategic Behavior in Hydropower-Dominated Electricity Markets: Empirical Evidence for Colombia," Borradores de Economia 12906, Banco de la Republica.
    2. Miguel A. Espinosa & Alvaro J. Riascos Villegas, 2010. "Strategic Behaviour, Resource Valuation and Competition in Electricity Markets," Documentos CEDE 6856, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    3. Araujo, Aloisio & de Castro, Luciano I., 2009. "Pure strategy equilibria of single and double auctions with interdependent values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 25-48, January.
    4. Francisco Alvarez & Francisco J. André, 2013. "Auctioning vs. Grandfathering in Cap-and-Trade Systems with Market Power and Incomplete Information," Working Papers 2013.98, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    5. Alvarez, Francisco & André, Francisco J., 2015. "Auctioning emission permits in a leader-follower setting," MPRA Paper 61698, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. John J. García Rendón & Alex F. Pérez-Libreros, 2019. "El precio spot de la electricidad y la inclusión de energía renovable no convencional: evidencia para Colombia," Documentos de Trabajo CIEF 17393, Universidad EAFIT.
    7. Ali Hortacsu & Jakub Kastl, "undated". "Informational Advantage and Information Structure: An Analysis of Canadian Treasury Auctions," Discussion Papers 09-031, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    8. Francisco Álvarez & Francisco André, 2015. "Auctioning Versus Grandfathering in Cap-and-Trade Systems with Market Power and Incomplete Information," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 873-906, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. de Castro, Luciano I. & Riascos, Alvaro, 2009. "Characterization of bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(9-10), pages 559-575, September.
    2. Moreira, Humberto Ataíde & Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de & Castro Filho, Luciano I. de, 2004. "Pure strategy equilibria of multidimensional and non-monotonic auctions," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 571, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).
    3. Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2007. "Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(6), pages 1721-1770, November.
    4. Prokopovych, Pavlo & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2023. "On monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a generalized contest," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 348-362.
    5. Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Richard McLean, 2014. "On the existence of Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games," Departmental Working Papers 201402, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    6. Emiel Maasland & Sander Onderstal, 2006. "Going, Going, Gone! A Swift Tour of Auction Theory and its Applications," De Economist, Springer, vol. 154(2), pages 197-249, June.
    7. Aloisio Araujo & Luciano Castro & Humberto Moreira, 2008. "Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(3), pages 407-440, June.
    8. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    9. Susan Athey & Philip A. Haile, 2006. "Empirical Models of Auctions," NBER Working Papers 12126, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Rittwik Chatterjee, 2013. "A Brief Survey of the Theory of Auction," South Asian Journal of Macroeconomics and Public Finance, , vol. 2(2), pages 169-191, December.
    11. Raphaële Préget, 2004. "Adjudications des valeurs du Trésor," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 18(4), pages 63-110.
    12. Kotowski, Maciej H. & Li, Fei, 2014. "On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 84-108.
    13. Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2001. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 542-558, June.
    14. Fang, Hanming & Parreiras, Sergio O., 2002. "Equilibrium of Affiliated Value Second Price Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders: The Two-Bidder Case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 215-236, May.
    15. Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Richard P. McLean, 2018. "On the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Bayesian Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 43(2), pages 100-129, February.
    16. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2004. "Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Privately Known Budget Constraints," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000373, UCLA Department of Economics.
    17. Yusuke Matsuki, 2016. "A Distribution-Free Test of Monotonicity with an Application to Auctions," Working Papers e110, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
    18. Shrestha, Ratna K., 2017. "Menus of price-quantity contracts for inducing the truth in environmental regulation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 1-7.
    19. Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017. "An invitation to market design," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 541-571.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multi-unit auctions; first order conditions; truth-telling; identification; monotonic bestreply.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:col:000089:004382. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Universidad De Los Andes-Cede (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ceandco.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.