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Does Stringency of Gubernatorial Term Limits Matter?

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Author Info
Peter Calcagno () (Department of Economics and Finance, College of Charleston)
Monica Escaleras () (Department of Economics, Florida Atlantic University)

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Abstract

Political institutions within a society often serve to establish the rules governing the economic actions of members, help establish norms of appropriate economic behavior between the members, and ultimately help to explain the relative economic performance of the society. Institutional details like the role of budgetary constraints, party ideology, term limits, and voting methods have been analyzed with particular emphasis on the interplay of political and economic variables. Within this field, we believe that the study of term limits is of particular importance. Hence, this paper empirically investigates the link between the level of stringency of term limits and state expenditures after controlling for other characteristics of political institutions. Using panel data from 37 states in the U.S. between 1971 and 2000, the empirical results indicate that the stringency of term limits is an important factor in determining state expenditures.

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File URL: http://www.cofc.edu/~econfinc/workingpapers/term_limit_revision1_9.19.07.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2007
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics and Finance, College of Charleston in its series Working Papers with number 2.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2007
Date of revision: Sep 2007
Handle: RePEc:coc:wpaper:2

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Web page: http://www.cofc.edu/~econfinc/
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Related research
Keywords: State Expenditures; State government; Term Limits; Party Alternation;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures

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    Other versions:
  5. Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 1995. "Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 769-98, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. von Hagen, Jurgen, 1991. "A note on the empirical effectiveness of formal fiscal restraints," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 199-210, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Nouriel Roubini & Jeffrey Sachs, 1989. "Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the Industrial Economies," NBER Working Papers 2919, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Crain, W Mark & Oakley, Lisa K, 1995. "The Politics of Infrastructure," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(1), pages 1-17, April.
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  12. Daniel, Kermit & Lott, John R, Jr, 1997. " Term Limits and Electoral Competitiveness: Evidence from California's State Legislative Races," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 90(1-4), pages 165-84, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
  17. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1990. "A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(3), pages 403-14, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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