Intentions, Trust and Frames: A note on Sociality and the Theory of Games
AbstractPsychological Game Theory (PGT) extends classical game theory allowing for the formal analysis of belief-dependent sentiments and emotions such as resentment, pride, shame, gratefulness, and the like. PGT incorporates these factors by relating agents subjective expected utility to players strategies, to their beliefs about others strategies, but also to their beliefs about others beliefs about their strategies, and so on. This paper argues that, thanks to the epistemic consequences of this hierarchy of beliefs, PGT is well-endowed to address, and to some extent solve three of the most challenging problems recently emerged in classical game theory, namely, the problem of intentions, that of trust and that of decision frames.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia in its series Working Paper CRENoS with number 200702.
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
intentions; trust; psychological games;
Other versions of this item:
- Vittorio Pelligra, 2011. "Intentions, Trust and Frames: A Note on Sociality and the Theory of Games," Review of Social Economy, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 69(2), pages 163-188.
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-02-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2007-02-10 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2007-02-10 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2007-02-10 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2007-02-10 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2007-02-10 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
- NEP-UPT-2007-02-10 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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