Achim I. Czerny () (Workgroup for Infrastructure Policy (WIP), Technische Universität Berlin)
Abstract
Congestion pricing and slot constraints can be used to manage airport congestion. We analyze the effect of uncertainty and complementary airport demand on the choice of regulation instruments. Analysis is based on a model including a single airport and uncertain passenger benefits that is gradually extended such that it includes a two-airport system and uncertain congestion costs. We demonstrate that uncertainty favors the use of congestion pricing while demand complementarity can favor the use of slot constraints. However, congestion pricing is always the right choice from a welfare perspective. We show that unregulated monopolistic airports also choose prices as instruments, but, that monopoly charges are too high.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Center for Network Industries and Infrastructure (CNI) in its series Working Papers with number
2007-01.
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