Learning From The Skills Of Others: Experimental Evidence
AbstractThis paper reports an experimental test of how, when observing others' actions, participants learn more than just information that the others have. We use a setting where all information is public and where subjects face two kinds of information sets: (1) the information that is necessary and su±cient for them to payoff-maximize and (2) the decisions of previous players. We show that by observing the second type of information subjects learn how to improve their own decision-making process. Specifically, the accurate players make small errors no matter what information set they face whereas the inaccurate players perform much better when the decisions of others are public.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business in its series GSIA Working Papers with number 2006-E25.
Date of creation: Nov 2005
Date of revision:
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Postal: Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
Web page: http://www.tepper.cmu.edu/
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