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How To Compensate Physicians When Both Patient and Physician Effort Are Unobservable

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Author Info
Leonard, K.L.
Zivin, J.

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Abstract

In this paper, we construct a joint production model of health with two-sided asymmetric information and ask the question, "Hwo should physicians be compensated?" We demonstrate theoretically that the preferred physician compensation scheme depends on the illness condition.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Columbia University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 2000_02.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:clu:wpaper:2000_02

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Related research
Keywords: INFORMATION ; HEALTH SERVICES ; PHYSICIANS ; COMPENSATION;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets

Cited by:
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  1. Udo Schneider & Volker Ulrich, 2005. "The Physician-Patient Relationship Revisited - the Patient's View," HEW 0505001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Udo Schneider, 2002. "Beidseitige Informationsasymmetrien in der Arzt-Patient-Beziehung: Implikationen für die GKV," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 71(4), pages 447-458.
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.

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