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Game Theory and Industrial Organization Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Bagwell, K.
Wolinsky, A.
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In this article, we consider how important developments in game theory have contributed to the theory of industrial organization.
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Paper provided by Columbia University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number
2000_01.
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Length: 52 pages
Date of creation: 2000Date of revision:
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Keywords: GAME THEORY ; INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ; Other versions of this item:
Paper Chapter Bagwell, Kyle & Wolinsky, Asher, 2002.
"Game theory and industrial organization ,"
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications ,
in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 49, pages 1851-1895
Elsevier.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Find related papers by JEL classification: C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship ,"
Econometrica ,
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Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey, 1988.
"Advertising and Limit Pricing ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
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Other versions: Franco Modigliani, 1958.
"New Developments on the Oligopoly Front ,"
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Shilony, Yuval, 1977.
"Mixed pricing in oligopoly ,"
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Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1987.
"Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Use of Game Theory in Industrial Organization ,"
American Economic Review ,
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Vrinda Kadiyali, 1996.
"Entry, Its Deterrence, and Its Accommodation: A Study of the U.S. Photographic Film Industry ,"
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A. Michael Spence, 1977.
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Dixit, Avinash, 1980.
"The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence ,"
Economic Journal ,
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Other versions: Varian, Hal R, 1980.
"A Model of Sales ,"
American Economic Review ,
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Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984.
"Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information ,"
Econometrica ,
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Other versions: Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David I & Maskin, Eric, 1994.
"The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 997-1039, September.
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Other versions:
Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994.
"The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
2058, David K. Levine.
[Downloadable!] Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. & Maskin, E., 1989.
"The Folk Theorem With Inperfect Public Information ,"
Working papers
523, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994.
"The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
394, David K. Levine.
[Downloadable!] Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985.
"Export subsidies and international market share rivalry ,"
Journal of International Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Kyle Bagwell & Robert Staiger, 1997.
"Collusion Over the Business Cycle ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
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Other versions: Harsanyi, John C, 1995.
"Games with Incomplete Information ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
Other versions: John Haltiwanger & Joseph E. Harrington Jr., 1991.
"The Impact of Cyclical Demand Movements on Collusive Behavior ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(1), pages 89-106, Spring.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1999.
"Reputation and Imperfect Information ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
238, David K. Levine.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Friedman, James W, 1971.
"A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January.
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Villas-Boas, J Miguel, 1995.
"Models of Competitive Price Promotions: Some Empirical Evidence from the Coffee and Saltine Crackers Markets ,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 4(1), pages 85-107, Spring.
Severin Boreinstein & Andrea Shepard, 1996.
"Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(3), pages 429-451, Autumn.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982.
"Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1997.
"Predation, reputation , and entry deterrence ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
1460, David K. Levine.
[Downloadable!] Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1980.
"Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence ,"
Discussion Papers
427, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!] Eaton, Jonathan & Grossman, Gene M, 1986.
"Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 101(2), pages 383-406, May.
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Other versions: Rosenthal, Robert W, 1980.
"A Model in Which an Increase in the Number of Sellers Leads to a Higher Price ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 48(6), pages 1575-79, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey, 1991.
"Oligopoly Limit Pricing ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(2), pages 155-172, Summer.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Robert H. Porter, 1983.
"A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886 ,"
Bell Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 301-314, Autumn.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983.
"Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes ,"
Bell Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1984.
"The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 361-66, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982.
"Sequential Equilibria ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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repec:bep:thecon:v:2:y:2002:i:1:p:1053-1053 is not listed on IDEAS
repec:bep:thetop:v:7:y:2007:i:1:p:1366-1366 is not listed on IDEAS
Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Harrington, Joseph E., 2005.
"Collusion under Monitoring of Sales ,"
Research Papers
1885, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006.
"Reputations, relationships and the enforcement of incomplete contracts ,"
Discussion Papers
0506-23, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Hoernig, Steffen & Pita Barros, Pedro Luis & Valletti, Tommaso, 2001.
"Universal Service and Entry: the Role of Uniform Pricing and Coverage Constraints ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2789, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2004.
"Non-Monotone Comparative Statics in Games of Incomplete Information ,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000000662, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2007.
"Cross and Double Cross: Comparative Statics in First Price Auctions ,"
Levine's Bibliography
321307000000000831, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
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