The economics of Repeated Extortion
AbstractThis paper provides a simple model of repeated extortion. In particlar, we ask whether corrupt government official' ex post opprtunism to demand more once enterpreneurs have made sunk investments entails further distortion in resource allocations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Columbia University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 1998_04.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
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CORRUPTION ; INVESTMENTS;
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