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The economics of Repeated Extortion

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Author Info
Leonard, K.L.
Leonard, D.K.
Abstract

This paper provides a simple model of repeated extortion. In particlar, we ask whether corrupt government official' ex post opprtunism to demand more once enterpreneurs have made sunk investments entails further distortion in resource allocations.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Columbia University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 1998_04.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:clu:wpaper:1998_04

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Related research
Keywords: CORRUPTION ; INVESTMENTS;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D90 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - General
H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General

Cited by:
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  1. Jay Pil Choi & Marcel Thum, 2000. "The Dynamics of Corruption with the Ratchet Effect," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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