Free markets for health care in Africa do not function properly, in that patients exhibit willingness to pay for health care and yet practitioners are unable to sell their services. Its widely acknowledged that health markets everywhere are troubled with imperfect information. Therefore it is no surprise that free markets and spot contracts do not lead to an efficiently functioning market for health care. When issues of agency are not resolved we find pratitioners specializing in the sale of pharmaceuticals but not using their skills as diagnosticians. Mechanisms that can reduce agency cost are beneficial to both patients and pratitioners. This paper drawns on theory and empirical evidence to examine what institutions are necessary to solve the problems of imperfect information in this context.
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Paper provided by Columbia University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number
1998_03.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General O20 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - General
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