This paper establishes a clear connection between equilibrium theory, game theory and social choice theory by showing that, for a well defined social choice problem, a condition which is necessary and sufficient to solve this problem - limited arbitrage - is the same as the condition which is necessary and sufficient to establish the existence of an equilibrium and the core.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Columbia University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number
1996_31.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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