Markets and Optimal Evadable Taxation
AbstractA simple model of indirect taxation, evasion, and enforcement is presentedin which some surprising results emerge. Because of a 'market- thinning' effect of high prices, high taxes lead to multiple equilibria (low-price black markets and high-price legal markets), and black- market comparative statics tend to give the 'wrong' sign. Further, the incentive compatabilityconstraint for tax compliance is shown to confer a kind of concavity on e nforcement costs.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Columbia University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 1996_22.
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
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