This paper investigates the manner in which the civil law sets incentives , given that courts do not directly observe that the law would hope to control. The paper proposes a model that casts the civil law's problem as a ccombination of moral hazard in the underlying activity and adverse selection in a second-stage signaling game ( the "hearing", where "types in the latter are determined by actions in the former.
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Paper provided by Columbia University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number
1996_01.
Find related papers by JEL classification: K1 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
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