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Executive Compensation and Agency Effects

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Author Info

  • Idson, T.L.
  • Goldberg, L.G.

Abstract

The separation of ownership from control in large corporations can cause agency problems. This study analyzes the effects of the dispersion of corporate ownership on the compensation of the top executives of Fortune 500 companies. The effects are estimated across the executive hierarchy and for different components of the compensation package in contrast to more limited previous studies. The results indicate that there is a significant agency effect on executive pay, though the magnitude is small relative to company size. The effects are greatest for the most liquid form of remuneration, salaries, and are nonuniform across executive categories, with the strongest effect found for the Chairman of the Board. Copyright 1995 by MIT Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Columbia University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 1993_09.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 1993
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:clu:wpaper:1993_09

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Keywords: wages;

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Cited by:
  1. Chen, Carl R. & Steiner, Thomas L. & Whyte, Ann Marie, 2006. "Does stock option-based executive compensation induce risk-taking? An analysis of the banking industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 915-945, March.
  2. Chiraz Ben Ali & Frédéric Teulon, 2014. "CEO Monitoring and board effectiveness - Resolving CEO compensation issue," Working Papers 2014-045, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
  3. Thanida Chitnomrath & Robert Evans & Theo Christopher, 2011. "Corporate governance and post-bankruptcy reorganisation performance: Evidence from Thailand," Asian Review of Accounting, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 19(1), pages 50-67, May.
  4. Engesaeth, E.J.P., 2011. "Managerial compensation contracting," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-4807459, Tilburg University.
  5. Elston, Julie Ann & Goldberg, Lawrence G., 2003. "Executive compensation and agency costs in Germany," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(7), pages 1391-1410, July.
  6. Cheung, Yan-Leung & Stouraitis, Aris & Wong, Anita W.S., 2005. "Ownership concentration and executive compensation in closely held firms: Evidence from Hong Kong," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 511-532, September.
  7. Grund, Christian & Walter, Tanja, 2013. "Management Compensation and the Economic Crisis: Longitudinal Evidence from the German Chemical Sector," IZA Discussion Papers 7435, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  8. Yan-Leung Cheung & Aris Stouraitis & Anita Wong, 2003. "Ownership Concentation and Executive COmpenation in Closely Held Firms: Evidence from Hong Kong," Working Papers 142003, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.

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