Why Does Capital Flow From Poor To Rich Countries? Interest Groups And Dynamic Games In Poor Countries
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Columbia University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 1990_41.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 1990
Date of revision:
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capital movements ; game theory ; economic growth ; developing countries;
Other versions of this item:
- Tornell, Aaron & Velasco, Andres, 1990. "Why Does Capital Flow From Poor To Rich Countries? Interest Groups And Dynamic Games In Poor Countries," Working Papers 90-39, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
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