On The Job Screening, Up Or Out Rules, And Firm Growth
AbstractThis paper uses on-the-job screening to derive a stochastic and dynamic model of hiring, promotion, and dismissal policies, and their impact on total firm employment and output. The model provides an explanation of the up-or-out rule observed in many organizations. It also provides an explanation for a cost-of-adjustment mechanism for the stock of human capital in a firm.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Columbia University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 1989_02.
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 1989
Date of revision:
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economic growth ; enterprises ; human capital ; employment ; production;
Other versions of this item:
- Brendan O'Flaherty & Aloysius Siow, 1992. "On the Job Screening, up or out Rules, and Firm Growth," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 25(2), pages 346-68, May.
- O'Flaherty, B. & Siow, A., 1990. "On the Job Screening, Up or Out Rules, and Firm Growth," University of Chicago - Economics Research Center 90-11, Chicago - Economics Research Center.
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