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Interpreting the Unconventional U.S. Monetary Policy of 2007-09

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  • Ricardo Reis

    () (Columbia University - Department of Economics)

Abstract

This paper reviews the unconventional U.S. monetary policy responses to the financial and real crises of 2007-09, divided into three groups: interest rate policy, quantitative policy, and credit policy. To interpret interest rate policy, it compares the Federal Reserve's actions with the literature on optimal policy in a liquidity trap. This comparison suggests that policy has been in the direction indicated by theory, but it has not gone far enough. To interpret quantitative policy, the paper reviews the determination of inflation under different policy regimes. The main danger for inflation from current actions is that the Federal Reserve may lose its policy independence; a beneficial side effect of the crisis is that the Friedman rule can be implemented by paying interest on reserves. To interpret credit policy, the paper presents a new model of capital market imperfections with different financial institutions and a role for securitization , leveraging, and mark-to-market accounting. The model suggests that providing credit to traders in securities markets is a more effective response than extending credit to the originators of loans.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Columbia University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 0910-13.

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Date of creation: 2010
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Handle: RePEc:clu:wpaper:0910-13

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  1. Alan Auerbach & Maurice Obstfeld, 2004. "The Case for Open-Market Purchases in a Liquidity Trap," Macroeconomics 0407009, EconWPA.
  2. Cúrdia, Vasco & Woodford, Michael, 2009. "Conventional and Unconventional Monetary Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 7514, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Alex Cukierman, 2006. "Central Bank Independence and Monetary Policymaking Institutions: Past, Present, and Future," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 360, Central Bank of Chile.
  4. Sims, Christopher A, 1994. "A Simple Model for Study of the Determination of the Price Level and the Interaction of Monetary and Fiscal Policy," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 381-99.
  5. Gary B. Gorton, 2009. "Information, Liquidity, and the (Ongoing) Panic of 2007," NBER Working Papers 14649, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2009. "Monetary Policy Strategy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262513374.
  7. Matthew B. Canzoneri & Robert E. Cumby & Behzad T. Diba, 1998. "Is the Price Level Determined by the Needs of Fiscal Solvency?," NBER Working Papers 6471, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Kiminori Matsuyama, 2008. "Aggregate Implications of Credit Market Imperfections," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2007, Volume 22, pages 1-60 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Romer, Christina D., 1992. "What Ended the Great Depression?," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(04), pages 757-784, December.
  10. Lars E.O. Svensson, 2003. "Escaping from a Liquidity Trap and Deflation: The Foolproof Way and Others," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 145-166, Fall.
  11. Olivier Blanchard, 2009. "The Crisis: Basic Mechanisms and Appropriate Policies," CESifo Forum, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 10(1), pages 3-14, 04.
  12. Reis, Ricardo, 2007. "The analytics of monetary non-neutrality in the Sidrauski model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 129-135, January.
  13. Woodford, Michael, 1995. "Price-level determinacy without control of a monetary aggregate," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-46, December.
  14. Markus K. Brunnermeier, 2009. "Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 23(1), pages 77-100, Winter.
  15. Goodfriend, Marvin, 2000. "Overcoming the Zero Bound on Interest Rate Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(4), pages 1007-35, November.
  16. Stephen G. Cecchetti, 2009. "Crisis and Responses: The Federal Reserve in the Early Stages of the Financial Crisis," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 23(1), pages 51-75, Winter.
  17. Franklin Allen & Ana Babus & Elena Carletti, 2009. "Financial Crises: Theory and Evidence," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 97-116, November.
  18. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Michael Woodford, 2003. "The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 34(1), pages 139-235.
  19. Tiago C. Berriel & Saroj Bhattarai, 2009. "Monetary Policy and Central Bank Balance Sheet Concerns," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1.
  20. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
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Cited by:
  1. Nuno Cassola & Claudio Morana, 2010. "The 2007-? financial crisis: a euro area money market perspective," ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series 35-2010, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
  2. Fabio Bagliano & Claudio Morana, 2010. "The Great Recession: US dynamics and spillovers to the world economy," CeRP Working Papers 103, Center for Research on Pensions and Welfare Policies, Turin (Italy).
  3. Ansgar Belke & Jens Klose, 2010. "(How) Do the ECB and the Fed React to Financial Market Uncertainty? – The Taylor Rule in Times of Crisis," Ruhr Economic Papers 0166, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
  4. Zeng, Zhixiong, 2010. "A theory of the non-neutrality of money with banking frictions and bank recapitalization," MPRA Paper 24752, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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