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Expanding "Choice" in School Choice

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Author Info
Atila Abdulkadiroglu () (Duke University - Department of Economics)
Yeon-Koo Che () (Columbia University - Department of Economics)
Yosuke Yasuda () (Columbia University - Department of Economics)

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Abstract

Truthful revelation of preferences has emerged as a desideratum in the design of school choice programs. Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof for students but limits their ability to communicate their preference intensities. This results in ex-ante inefficiency when ties at school preferences are broken randomly. We propose a variant of deferred acceptance mechanism which allows students to influence how they are treated in ties. It maintains truthful revelation of ordinal preferences and supports a greater scope of efficiency.

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Paper provided by Columbia University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 0809-09.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:clu:wpaper:0809-09

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  1. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2005. "The New York City High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 364-367, May. [Downloadable!]
  2. M.Utku Unver & Tayfun Sonmez, 2003. "Course Bidding at Business Schools," Working Papers 257, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2003. [Downloadable!]
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  3. EHLERS, Lars, 2006. "Respecting Priorities when Assigning Students to Schools," Cahiers de recherche 2006-04, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
  4. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Smez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," Discussion Papers 0203-18, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Roth, Alvin E., 1985. "The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 277-288, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 643-51, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Ergin, Haluk & Sonmez, Tayfun, 2006. "Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 215-237, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A Pathak & Alvin E Roth, 2008. "Strategy-proofness vs. Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redisigning the NYC High School Match," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000002108, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve, 2001. "A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 295-328, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Casella, Alessandra, 2005. "Storable votes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 391-419, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A Pathak & Alvin E Roth, 2008. "Strategy-proofness vs. Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redisigning the NYC High School Match," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000002108, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Yeon-Koo Che & Fuhito Kojima, 2008. "Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1677, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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