Strategic Militarization, Deterrence and Wars
AbstractWe study countries choosing armament levels and then whether or not to go to war. We show that if the costs of war are not overly high or low, then all equilibria must involve "dove," "hawk," and "deterrent" strategies and the probability of war is positive (but less than one) in any given period. Wars are between countries with differing armament levels and the frequency of wars is tempered by the presence of armament levels that are expressly chosen for their deterrent properties. As the probability of winning a war becomes more reactive to increased armament, the frequency of wars decreases. Finally, as it becomes increasingly possible to negotiate a credible settlement, the probability of peace increases, but the variance of armament levels increases and war becomes increasingly likely when negotiation is not available. This matches observed patterns in the data over time.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Columbia University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 0708-04.
Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Morelli, Massimo, 2009. "Strategic Militarization, Deterrence and Wars," International Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 4(4), pages 279-313, December.
- NEP-ALL-2008-02-09 (All new papers)
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- Petros G. Sekeris, 2012. "The Tragedy of the Commons in a Violent World," Working Papers 1213, University of Namur, Department of Economics.
- Hodler, Roland & Yektaş, Hadi, 2012.
Games and Economic Behavior,
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