Competitive effects of vertical integration
AbstractThe paper surveys the economics literature on the competitive effects of vertical integration, assesses the relevance of the economics literature for several recent regulatory and antitrust cases, and defends a structured rule of reason approach to evaluating the competitive effects.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Columbia University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 0506-11.
Length: 73 pages
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
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- Hans-Theo Normann, 2008.
"Vertical Integration, Raising Rivals’ Costs and Upstream Collusion,"
Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
2008_30, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Normann, Hans-Theo, 2009. "Vertical integration, raising rivals' costs and upstream collusion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 461-480, May.
- Michiel Bijlsma & Viktoria Kocsis & Victoria Shestalova & Gijsbert Zwart, 2008. "Vertical foreclosure: a policy framework," CPB Document 157, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2008:i:22:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
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