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Competitive effects of vertical integration

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Author Info
Michael H. Riordan () (Columbia University - Department of Economics)
Abstract

The paper surveys the economics literature on the competitive effects of vertical integration, assesses the relevance of the economics literature for several recent regulatory and antitrust cases, and defends a structured rule of reason approach to evaluating the competitive effects.

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File URL: http://www.econ.columbia.edu/RePEc/pdf/DP0506-11.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Columbia University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 0506-11.

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Length: 73 pages
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:clu:wpaper:0506-11

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  1. Daniel P. O'Brien & Greg Shaffer, 1992. "Vertical Control with Bilateral Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(3), pages 299-308, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. G.F. Mathewson & R.A. Winter, 1984. "An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(1), pages 27-38, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Ching-To Albert Ma, 1997. "Option Contracts and Vertical Foreclosure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 6(4), pages 725-753, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Mullin, Joseph C & Mullin, Wallace P, 1997. "United States Steel's Acquisition of the Great Northern Ore Properties: Vertical Foreclosure or Efficient Contractual Governance?," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 74-100, April.
  5. George Baker & Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 2002. "Relational Contracts And The Theory Of The Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(1), pages 39-84, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Rabah Amir, 2000. "On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1475, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Reiffen, David, 1992. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 694-97, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Hart, O. & Tirole, J., 1990. "Vertical Integration And Market Foreclosure," Working papers 548, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  9. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 1984. "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 171-196, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. McAfee, R Preston & Schwartz, Marius, 1994. "Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 210-30, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston, 2003. "Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 757-791, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Jeffrey Church & Neil Gandal, 2000. "Systems Competition, Vertical Merger, and Foreclosure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 9(1), pages 25-51, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Tasneem Chipty, 2001. "Vertical Integration, Market Foreclosure, and Consumer Welfare in the Cable Television Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 428-453, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Jay Pil Choi & Sang-Seung Yi, 2000. "Vertical Foreclosure with the Choice of Input Specifications," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(4), pages 717-743, Winter.
  17. Joseph J. Spengler, 1950. "Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 347. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Salinger, Michael A, 1988. "Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(2), pages 345-56, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Riordan, Michael H, 1998. "Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1232-48, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  20. Patrick de Graba, 1996. "Most-Favored-Customer Clauses and Multilateral Contracting: When Nondiscrimination Implies Uniformity," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 5(4), pages 565-579, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Patrick Rey & Thibaud Vergé, 2003. "Bilateral Control with Vertical Contracts," Industrial Organization 0309005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  22. Ordover, Janusz A & Saloner, Garth & Salop, Steven C, 1990. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 127-42, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Grimm, Curtis M & Winston, Clifford & Evans, Carol A, 1992. "Foreclosure of Railroad Markets: A Test of Chicago Leverage Theory," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 295-310, October.
  24. Ali Hortacsu & Chad Syverson, 2006. "Cementing Relationships: Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, Productivity, and Prices," Working Papers 06-21, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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