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On the Value of Legal Representation

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Author Info
Yeon-Koo Che () (Columbia University - Department of Economics)
Sergei Severinov () (Duke University - Economics Group)

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Abstract

In this paper we investigate how the advice that lawyers provide to their clients affects the disclosure of evidence and the outcome of adjudication, and how the adjudicator should allocate the burden of proof in light of the effect. Despite lawyers' expertise in assessing the evidence, their advice is found to have no effect on adjudication in a broad set of circumstances, if legal advice is costless and the lawyers follow undominated strategies in disclosure. A lawyer's advice can influence the outcome to his client's favor, either if he can credibly advise his client to suppress some favorable evidence or if there is a cost associated with legal advice. The effect is socially undesirable in the former case, but it is desirable in the latter case although the benefit rests on its purely dissipative role as a "money burning" device rather than on his expertise.

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File URL: http://www.econ.columbia.edu/RePEc/pdf/DP0506-06.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Columbia University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 0506-06.

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Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:clu:wpaper:0506-06

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 461-83, December.
  2. Gilat Levy, 2005. "Careerist Judges," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 275-297, Summer.
  3. Hyun Song Shin, 1998. "Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(2), pages 378-405, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Lipman Barton L. & Seppi Duane J., 1995. "Robust Inference in Communication Games with Partial Provability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 370-405, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Lewis, Tracy R & Poitevin, Michel, 1997. "Disclosure of Information in Regulatory Proceedings," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 50-73, April.
    Other versions:
  6. Daughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 2000. "On the Economics of Trials: Adversarial Process, Evidence, and Equilibrium Bias," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 365-94, October.
  7. Hay, Bruce L & Spier, Kathryn E, 1997. "Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 413-31, June.
  8. Chris William Sanchirico, 2004. "Relying on the Information of Interested--and Potentially Dishonest--Parties," Law and Economics 0403001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  9. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1986. "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 18-32, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2001. "A Model Of Expertise," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(2), pages 747-775, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Sanchirico, Chris William, 1997. "The burden of proof in civil litigation: A simple model of mechanism design," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 431-447, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Iossa, Elisabetta & Jullien, Bruno, 2007. "The Market for Lawyers: The Value of Information on the Quality of Legal Services," IDEI Working Papers 485, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
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