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The Effects of Extending Intellectual Property Rights Protection to Developing Countries: A Case Study of the Indian Pharmaceutical

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Author Info
Shubham Chaudhuri () (Columbia University - Department of Economics)
Pinelopi K. Goldberg () (Yale University - Department of Economics)
Panle Jia () (Yale University - Department of Economics)
Abstract

Under the TRIPS agreement, WTO members are required to enforce product patents for pharmaceuticals. The debate about the merits of this requirement has been and continues to be extremely contentious. Many poor developing economies claim that patent protection for pharmaceuticals will result in substantially higher prices for medicines, with adverse consequences for the health and well-being of their citizens. On the other hand, research-based global pharmaceutical companies, which claim to have lost billions of dollars because of patent infringement, argue that prices are unlikely to rise significantly because most patented products have therapeutic substitutes. In this paper we empirically investigate the basis of these claims. Central to the ongoing debate is the structure of demand for pharmaceuticals in poor economies where, because health insurance coverage is so rare, almost all medical expense are met out-of-pocket. Using a product-level data set from India, which is unique in terms of its detail and coverage, we estimate key price and expenditure elasticities and supply-side parameters for the fluoroquinolones sub-segment of the systemic anti-bacterials (i.e., antibiotics) segment of the Indian pharmaceuticals market. We then use these estimates to carry out counterfactual simulations of what prices, profits (of both domestic firms and multinational subsidiaries) and consumer welfare would have been, had the fluoroquinolone molecules we study been under patent in India as they were in the U.S. at the time. Our results suggest that concerns about the potential adverse welfare effects of TRIPS may have some basis. We estimate that in the absence of any price regulation or compulsory licensing, the total annual welfare losses to the Indian economy from the withdrawal of the four domestic product groups in the fluoroquinolone sub-segment would be on the order of U.S. $713 million, or about 118% of the sales of the entire systemic antibacterials segment in 2000. Of this amount, foregone profits of domestic producers constitute roughly $50 million (or 7%). The overwhelming portion of the total welfare loss therefore derives from the loss of consumer welfare. In contrast, the profit gains to foreign producers are estimated to be only around $57 million per year.

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Paper provided by Columbia University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 0304-08.

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Length: 53 pages
Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:clu:wpaper:0304-08

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  2. Michael Kremer, 1998. "Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism For Encouraging Innovation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(4), pages 1137-1167, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Jean O. Lanjouw, 1998. "The Introduction of Pharmaceutical Product Patents in India: "Heartless Exploitation of the Poor and Suffering"?," NBER Working Papers 6366, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Goldberg, Pinelopi Koujianou, 1995. "Product Differentiation and Oligopoly in International Markets: The Case of the U.S. Automobile Industry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(4), pages 891-951, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. McFadden, Daniel L., 1984. "Econometric analysis of qualitative response models," Handbook of Econometrics, in: Z. Griliches† & M. D. Intriligator (ed.), Handbook of Econometrics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 24, pages 1395-1457 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Michael Kremer, 1997. "Patent Buy-Outs: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation," NBER Working Papers 6304, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Wright, Brian Davern, 1983. "The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 691-707, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Aviv Nevo, 1998. "Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry," NBER Working Papers 6387, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Richard G. Frank & David S. Salkever, 1997. "Generic Entry and the Pricing of Pharmaceuticals," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 6(1), pages 75-90, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Jeffrey D. Sachs, 2002. "A new global effort to control malaria," Discussion Papers 0203-11, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Jerry A. Hausman, 1994. "Valuation of New Goods under Perfect and Imperfect Competition," NBER Working Papers 4970, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Lanjouw, Jean O. & Cockburn, Iain M., 2001. "New Pills for Poor People? Empirical Evidence after GATT," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-289, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Hausman, J.A., 1994. "Valuation of New Goods Under Perfect and Imperfect Competition," Working papers 94-21, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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  18. Helpman, Elhanan, 1993. "Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1247-80, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  19. Trajtenberg, Manuel, 1989. "The Welfare Analysis of Product Innovations, with an Application to Computed Tomography Scanners," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(2), pages 444-79, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Fink, Carsten, 2000. "How stronger patent protection in India might affect the behavior of transnational pharaceutical industries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2352, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  1. Aaditya Mattoo & Arvind Subramanian, 2004. "The WTO and the Poorest Countries: The Stark Reality," IMF Working Papers 04/81, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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