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College admissions with affirmative action

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  • Atila Abdulkadiroglu

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Columbia University)

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    Abstract

    This paper first shows that when colleges' preferences are substitutable there does not exist any stable matching mechanism that makes truthful revelation of preferences a dominant strategy for every student. The paper introduces student types and captures colleges' preferences for affirmative action via type-specific quotas: A college always prefers a set of students that respects its type-specific quotas to another set that violates them. Then it shows that the student-applying deferred acceptance mechanism makes truthful revelation of preferences a dominant strategy for every student if each college's preferences satisfy responsiveness over acceptable sets of students that respect its type-specific quotas. These results have direct policy implications in several entry-level labor markets (Roth 1991). Furthermore, a fairness notion and the related incentive theory developed here is applied to controlled choice in the context of public school choice by Abdulkadiroglu and Smez (2003).

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Columbia University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 0203-19.

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    Length: 33 pages
    Date of creation: 2003
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:clu:wpaper:0203-19

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