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Vertical Integration, Exclusive Dealing, and Ex Post Cartelization

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Author Info
Yongmin Chen () (University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Economics)
Michael H. Riordan () (Columbia University - Columbia Business School)

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Abstract

A vertically integrated firm has the incentive and ability to use exclusive contracts to foreclose an equally efficient upstream competitor and to effect a cartelization of the downstream industry. Its ability to do so may be limited when downstream firms are heterogeneous and supply contracts are not contingent on uncertain market conditions. The extent of cartelization depends on the degree of downstream market concentration and on the degree to which downstream competition is localized.

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File URL: http://www.econ.columbia.edu/RePEc/pdf/DP0203-13.pdf
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Paper provided by Columbia University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 0203-13.

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Length: 50 pages
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:clu:wpaper:0203-13

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. McAfee, R. Preston & Schwartz, Marius, 1995. "The non-existence of pairwise-proof equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 251-259, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Ordover, Janusz A & Saloner, Garth & Salop, Steven C, 1992. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 698-703, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Rasmusen, Eric B & Ramseyer, J Mark & Wiley, John S, Jr, 1991. "Naked Exclusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1137-45, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Ordover, Janusz A & Saloner, Garth & Salop, Steven C, 1990. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 127-42, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Perloff, Jeffrey M & Salop, Steven C, 1985. "Equilibrium with Product Differentiation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(1), pages 107-20, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Patrick Rey & Thibaud Vergé, 2004. "Bilateral Control with Vertical Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(4), pages 728-746, Winter.
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  7. G.F. Mathewson & R.A. Winter, 1984. "An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(1), pages 27-38, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Hans-Theo Normann, 2008. "Vertical Integration, Raising Rivals’ Costs and Upstream Collusion," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_30, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Neslihan Aydogan & Thomas P. Lyon, 2004. "Spatial Proximity and Complementarities in the Trading of Tacit Knowledge," Microeconomics 0404004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Michael H. Riordan & Yongmin Chen, 2005. "Price and Variety in the Spokes Model," Discussion Papers 0405-20, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Hans-Theo Normann, 2004. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure in the Repeated Game," Industrial Organization 0408008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  5. Carlo Reggiani, . "Optimal Differentiation and Spatial Competition: The Spokes Model with Product Delivery," Discussion Papers 09/13, Department of Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
  6. Arijit Mukherjee2 & Piercarlo Zanchettin, 2007. "Vertical integration and product innovation," Discussion Papers in Economics 07/12, Department of Economics, University of Leicester. [Downloadable!]
  7. Simon Loertscher & Yves Schneider, 2005. "Switching Costs, Firm Size, and Market Structure," Diskussionsschriften dp0515, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Volker Nocke & Lucy White, 2003. "Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Michael H. Riordan, 2005. "Competitive effects of vertical integration," Discussion Papers 0506-11, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Volker Nocke & Lucy White, 2003. "Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion? Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-013, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 08 Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
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