After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the emergence of the rule of law in post-communist societies

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After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the emergence of the rule of law in post-communist societies

Author Info

Karla Hoff () (World Bank - Development Economics Group (DEC))
Joseph E. Stiglitz () (Columbia University - Department of Economics)

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Abstract

When Russia launched mass privatization, it was widely believed that it would create a powerful constituency for the rule of law. That didn't happen. We present a dynamic equilibrium model of the political demand for the rule of law and show that beneficiaries of mass privatization may not demand the rule of law even if it is the Pareto efficient "rule of the game." The reason is that uncertainty about the legal regime can lead to asset stripping, and stripping can give agents an interest in prolonging the absence of the rule of law.

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Paper provided by Columbia University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 0203-03.

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Length: 57 pages
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:clu:wpaper:0203-03

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Article
- Karla Hoff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2004. "After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Societies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 753-763, June. [Downloadable!]
Paper
- Hoff, Karla & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 2002. "After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the emergence of the rule of law in post-communist societies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2934, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
- Karla Hoff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2002. "After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Societies," NBER Working Papers 9282, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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