1. Amrita Dhillon & Jean-Francois Mertens, 1999. "Relative Utilitarianism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(3), pages 471-498, May.
   Other versions:
   • DHILLONÊ, Amrita & MERTENSÊ, Jean-Franois, 1993. "Relative Utilitarianism," CORE Discussion Papers 1993048, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Sjostrom Tomas, 1994. "Implementation in Undominated Nash Equilibria without Integer Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 502-511, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Sjostrom, T., 1991. "Implementation in Undominated Nash Equilibria without Integer Games," Papers 491, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
4. Jackson, Matthew O, 1992. "Implementation in Undominated.Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(4), pages 757-75, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Matthew 0. Jackson, 1989. "Implementation in Undominated Strategies - A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 833, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
5. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1191-1220, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Walker, Mark, 1981. "A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(1), pages 65-71, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen & Rajiv Vohra, 1994. "Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 173-203, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Sobel, Joel, 2001. "Manipulation of Preferences and Relative Utilitarianism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 196-215, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Joel Sobel, 1998. "Manipulation of Preferences and Relative Utilitarianism," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 98-17, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
   • Joel Sobel, 1998. "Manipulation of Preferences and Relative Utilitarianism," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 1998-17, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
9. William Thomson, 2004. "Divide-and-Permute," RCER Working Papers 510, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Thomson, William, 2005. "Divide-and-permute," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 186-200, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Howard, J. V., 1992. "A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 142-159, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Moulin, H., 1984. "Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 32-45, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-18, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Rubinstein, Ariel & Safra, Zvi & Thomson, William, 1992. "On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-expected Utility Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1171-86, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. John Conley & Simon Wilkie, 1994. "Implementing the nash extension bargaining solution for non-convex problems," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 205-216, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu & Yamato, Takehiko, 1996. "Toward Natural Implementation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(4), pages 949-80, November.
    Other versions:
    • Saijo, T. & Tatamitani, Y. & Yamato, T., 1994. "Toward Natural Implementation," Papers 340, Osaka - Institute of Social and Economic Research.
16. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Abreu, Dilip & Sen, Arunava, 1990. "Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 285-299, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
19. Jackson Matthew O. & Palfrey Thomas R. & Srivastava Sanjay, 1994. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 474-501, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Matthew, Jackson O. & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay., 1990. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanism," Working Papers 754, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    • Matthew O. Jackson, 1990. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 966, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
20. Hurwicz, L, 1979. "Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(2), pages 217-25, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
21. Uzi Segal, 2000. "Let's Agree That All Dictatorships Are Equally Bad," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(3), pages 569-589, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
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1. Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003," Working Papers 2004-20, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(2), pages 219-258, May. [Downloadable!]
2. Claus-Jochen Haake, 2005. "Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets," Working Papers 366, Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics. [Downloadable!]
3. Britz, Volker & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2008. "Non-cooperative Support for the Asymmetric Nash Bargaining solution," Research Memoranda 018, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]