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Room assignment-rent division: A market approach

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  • Atila Abdulkadiroglu

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Columbia University)

  • Tayfun Sonmez

    ()
    (Boston College - Department of Economics)

  • M. Utku Unver

    ()
    (The University of Pittsburgh)

Abstract

A group of friends consider renting a house but they shall first agree on how to allocate its rooms and share the rent. We propose an auction mechanism for room assignment-rent division problems which mimics the market mechanism. Our auction mechanism is efficient, envy-free, individually-rational and it yields a non-negative price to each room whenever that is possible with envy-freeness.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Columbia University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 0102-11.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:clu:wpaper:0102-11

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Cited by:
  1. Azacis, Helmuts, 2005. "Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2005/10, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
  2. Bumin Yenmez, M., 2012. "Dissolving multi-partnerships efficiently," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 77-82.
  3. Andersson, T.D. & Andersson, C. & Talman, A.J.J., 2010. "Sets in Excess Demand in Ascending Auctions with Unit-Demand Bidders," Discussion Paper 2010-51, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  4. Carmen Beviá, 2010. "Manipulation games in economies with indivisible goods," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 209-222, March.
  5. Velez, Rodrigo A., 2011. "Are incentives against economic justice?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 326-345, January.

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