Is the Status Quo Relevant in a Representative Democracy?

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Is the Status Quo Relevant in a Representative Democracy?

Author Info

Jon X. Eguia

Abstract

This work studies the effect of the value of the status quo in the candidates' decisions and policy outcomes in a representative democracy with endogenous candidates. Following the citizen-candidate model due to Besley and Coate (1997) we show, for a unidimensional policy issue and for both an odd and even number of citizens, that some equilibria only hold for certain values of the status quo policy. In particular we find that a moderate status quo rules out equilibrium outcomes in which there is an uncontested candidate and that two-candidate equilibria exist more generally when the number of citizens is even.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences in its series Working Papers with number 1176.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2003
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published:
Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:1176

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2004-01-08 (All new papers)
NEP-CDM-2004-01-08 (Collective Decision-Making)
NEP-POL-2004-01-08 (Positive Political Economics)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Osborne, Martin J & Slivinski, Al, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinksi, 1995. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," Department of Economics Working Papers 1995-01, McMaster University. [Downloadable!]
Felli, Leonhardo & Merlo, Antonio, 2000. "Endogenous Lobbying," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Leonardo Felli & Antonio Merlo, 2001. "Endogenous Lobbying," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-043, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Oct 2004. [Downloadable!]
- Felli, L. & Merlo, A., 2000. "Endogenous Lobbying," Working Papers 00-04, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
- Felli, Leonardo & Merlo, Antonio, 2002. "Endogenous Lobbying," CEPR Discussion Papers 3174, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Leonardo Felli & Antonio Merlo, 2003. "Endogenous Lobbying," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 448, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
- Leonardo Felli & Antonio Merlo, . "Endogenous Lobbying," CARESS Working Papres 00-03, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
- Leonardo Felli & Antonio Merlo, 2006. "Endogenous Lobbying," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 4(1), pages 180-215, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114, February.
Other versions:
- Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, . ""An Economic Model of Representative Democracy''," CARESS Working Papres 95-02, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
- Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, . "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," Penn CARESS Working Papers ecf70d639d700dba5327ab0c8, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Eguia, Jon X., 2005. "Citizen candidates under uncertainty," Working Papers 1233, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Jon Eguia, 2007. "Citizen candidates under uncertainty," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 317-331, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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