We present a new model of voting which explains the so-called "roll-off" phenomenon: Selective abstention in multiple elections. We first characterize when a Bayesian voter prefers to abstain, and find that such choice necessitates correlation in the voter's beliefs between election outcomes and candidate policies. We then show that if a voter is ambiguity averse, he may abstain under more general circumstances. In fact, ambiguity aversion about the candidates' policy positions can make abstention look to the voter a smaller "mistake" than voting for one of the candidates. We investigate the conditions under which this happens, and find that it does when the voter sees the candidates as sufficiently complementary in their ambiguity. As this will likely happen in those elections on which the voter has poor or nil information, our model provides a possible explanation for selective abstention.
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Paper provided by California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences in its series Working Papers with number
1106.
Length: 35 pages Date of creation: Nov 2000 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:1106
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Ghirardato, Paolo & Maccheroni, Fabio & Marinacci, Massimo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2001.
"A Subjective Spin on Roulette Wheels,"
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1127, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!]
Ghirardato, Paolo & Maccheroni, Fabio & Marinacci, Massimo, 2002.
"Ambiguity from the Differential Viewpoint,"
Working Papers
1130, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!]
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Timothy J. Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1995.
"The Swing Voter's Curse,"
Discussion Papers
1064, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Massimiliano Amarante, 2003.
"Ambiguous Events,"
Discussion Papers
0304-04, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
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Ghirardato, Paolo & Maccheroni, Fabio & Marinacci, Massimo, 2002.
"Ambiguity from the Differential Viewpoint,"
Working Papers
1130, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: