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Out of the Wallet and into the Purse: Using Micro Data to Test Income Pooling Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Jennifer Ward-Batts (Claremont McKenna College)
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Unitary models, assuming a single objective function and unified budget constraint, are traditionally used to model household behavior. Most empirical tests of unitary models rely on endogenous regressors. This paper uses an exogenous change in the intrahousehold distribution of income, provided by a change in U.K. Family Allowance policy. Expenditure shares are estimated for a wide range of goods. Shifts in expenditure shares for assignable goods, such as men’s clothing, children’s clothing, and men’s tobacco, suggest that children benefited at the expense of men when this policy change shifted income within households from men to women.
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Paper provided by Claremont Colleges in its series Claremont Colleges Working Papers with number
2003-10.
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Date of creation: May 2003Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:clm:clmeco:2003-10Contact details of provider: Postal: 500 E. 9th Street, Claremont, CA 91711 Phone: (909) 607-3041 Fax: (909) 621-8249 Web page: http://www.claremontmckenna.edu/econ/papers/ More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: income pooling ; intrahousehold allocation ; child benefit ; collective model ; unitary model ; family policy ; household demand ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis D19 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Other D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs J18 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Public Policy
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