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A Political Economy Analysis of the Maastricht and Stability Pact Fiscal Criteria

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  • Thomas D. Willett

    (Claremont McKenna College and Claremont Graduate University)

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    File URL: http://www.claremontmckenna.edu/rdschool/papers/1999-33.pdf
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    Paper provided by Claremont Colleges in its series Claremont Colleges Working Papers with number 1999-33.

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    Handle: RePEc:clm:clmeco:1999-33

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    1. Eichengreen, Barry, 1993. "European Monetary Unification," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(3), pages 1321-57, September.
    2. Barry Eichengreen and Jurgen von Hagen., 1995. "Fiscal Policy and Monetary Union: Federalism, Fiscal Restrictions and the No-Bailout Rule," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C95-056, University of California at Berkeley.
    3. Restoy, Fernando, 1996. "Interest rates and fiscal discipline in monetary unions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(8), pages 1629-1646, November.
    4. Giancarlo Corsetti & Nouriel Roubini, 1997. "Politically Motivated Fiscal Deficits: Policy Issues in Closed and Open Economies," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(1), pages 27-54, 03.
    5. Richard C.K. Burdekin & Leroy O. Laney, 1986. "Fiscal policymaking and the central bank institutional constraint," Research Paper 8606, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    6. Buiter, Willem H & Corsetti, Giancarlo & Roubini, Nouriel, 1992. "`Excessive Deficits': Sense and Nonsense in the Treaty of Maastricht," CEPR Discussion Papers 750, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Poterba, James M, 1996. "Budget Institutions and Fiscal Policy in the U.S. States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 395-400, May.
    8. James M. Poterba, 1997. "Do Budget Rules Work?," NBER Working Papers 5550, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Stanley Fischer, 1995. "The Unending Search for Monetary Salvation," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10, pages 275-298 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Barry Eichengreen & Jurgen von Hagen, 1996. "Fiscal Policy and Monetary Union: Is There a Tradeoff between Federalism and Budgetary Restrictions?," NBER Working Papers 5517, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Peter Brandner & Leopold Diebalek & Helene Schuberth, 1998. "Structural Budget Deficits and Sustainability of Fiscal Positions in the European Union," Working Papers 26, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
    12. Reuven Glick & Michael Hutchison, 1992. "Fiscal policy in monetary unions: implications for Europe," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 92-02, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    13. McKinnon, Ronald I, 1997. "EMU as a Device for Collective Fiscal Retrenchment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 227-29, May.
    14. Maurice Obstfeld & Giovanni Peri, 1998. "Regional non-adjustment and fiscal policy," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 13(26), pages 205-259, 04.
    15. von Hagen, Jurgen & Harden, Ian J., 1995. "Budget processes and commitment to fiscal discipline," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 771-779, April.
    16. Canzoneri, Matthew B. & Diba, Behzad T., 1991. "Fiscal deficits, financial integration, and a central bank for Europe," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 381-403, December.
    17. Tamim Bayoumi & Barry Eichengreen, 1995. "Restraining Yourself: The Implications of Fiscal Rules for Economic Stabilization," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 42(1), pages 32-48, March.
    18. Unknown, 1998. "Discussion," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 619-643, October.
    19. Barry Eichengreen & Charles Wyplosz, 1998. "The Stability Pact: more than a minor nuisance?," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 13(26), pages 65-113, 04.
    20. Unknown, 1998. "Discussion," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 645-650, October.
    21. Michael Artis & Massimiliano Marcellino, . "Fiscal Solvency and Fiscal Forecasting in Europe," Working Papers 142, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    22. Jensen, Henrik, 1996. "The advantage of international fiscal cooperation under alternative monetary regimes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 485-504, November.
    23. Eijffinger, S-C-W & de Haan, J, 1996. "The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence," Princeton Studies in International Economics 19, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
    24. José Angulo & N. Cressie & C. Wikle & P. Soidán & M. Bande & C. Glasbey & John Kent & Ana Militino & Michael Stein, 1998. "Discussion," TEST: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-285, December.
    25. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1996. "Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions," NBER Working Papers 5556, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    26. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1994. "The Political Economy of Budget Deficits," NBER Working Papers 4637, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    27. Adam S. Posen, 1995. "Declarations Are Not Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central Bank Independence," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10, pages 253-274 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    28. Donato Masciandaro, 1995. "Designing a central bank: Social player, monetary agent, or banking agent?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 399-410, October.
    29. Antonio Fatás, 1998. "Does EMU need a fiscal federation?," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 13(26), pages 163-203, 04.
    30. Unknown, 1998. "Discussion," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 651-652, October.
    31. Perotti, Roberto, 1996. "Fiscal Consolidation in Europe: Composition Matters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 105-10, May.
    32. Dornbusch, Rudi, 1997. "Fiscal Aspects of Monetary Integration," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 221-23, May.
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