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Plea Bargaining with Budgetary Constraints

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Author Info
Steeve Mongrain
Joanne Roberts

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Abstract

In this paper, we construct a simple model that illustrates a perverse effect associated with plea bargaining in which an increase in sanctions can lead to reduced deterrence. This finding is derived from the interaction of binding budgetary constraints and plea bargaining. In an environment with these institutional features, higher sanctions are not always optimal when resources are limited, even if such sanctions are costless. Such potential phenomena may be useful in explaining the fact that many states have introduced limitations on plea bargaining. Prosecutors being concerned with their conviction rates is necessary for such a result to be present.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Calgary in its series Working Papers with number 2009-05.

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Date of creation: 23 Jan 2009
Date of revision: 23 Jan 2009
Handle: RePEc:clg:wpaper:2009-05

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law

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  1. Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1988. "Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 713-28, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Ehrlich, Isaac, 1996. "Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 43-67, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Levitt, Steven D. & Miles, Thomas J., 2007. "Empirical Study of Criminal Punishment," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Landes, William M, 1971. "An Economic Analysis of the Courts," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(1), pages 61-107, April.
  5. Chris William Sanchirico, 2008. "A Primary-Activity Approach to Proof Burdens," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 273-313, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Bruce H. Kobayashi, 1992. "Deterrence with Multiple Defendants: An Explanation for "Unfair" Plea Bargains," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(4), pages 507-517, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Eric Rasmusen & Manu Raghav, & Mark Ramseyer, 2008. "Convictions versus Conviction Rates: The Prosecutor’s Choice," Working Papers 2008-16, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
  8. Grossman, Gene M & Katz, Michael L, 1983. "Plea Bargaining and Social Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 749-57, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Richard T. Boylan, 2005. "What Do Prosecutors Maximize? Evidence from the Careers of U.S. Attorneys," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(2), pages 379-402. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Ramseyer, J Mark & Rasmusen, Eric B, 2001. "Why Is the Japanese Conviction Rate So High?," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 53-88, January.
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  11. Stigler, George J, 1970. "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(3), pages 526-36, May-June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Thomas Miceli, 2007. "The Economics of Criminal Procedure," Working papers 2007-24, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1994. "Marginal Deterrence in Enforcement of Law," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 1039-66, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. James Andreoni, 1991. "Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the Penalty Fit the Crime?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(3), pages 385-395, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Arun S. Malik, 1990. "Avoidance, Screening and Optimum Enforcement," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(3), pages 341-353, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Baker, Scott & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2001. "Prosecutorial Resources, Plea Bargaining, and the Decision to Go to Trial," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(1), pages 149-67, April.
  17. Boylan, Richard T & Long, Cheryl X, 2005. "Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career Objectives of Federal Prosecutors," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(2), pages 627-51, October.
  18. William M. Landes, 1974. "Legality and Reality: Some Evidence on Criminal Procedure," NBER Working Papers 0040, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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