Government Oversight of Public Universities: Are Centralized Performance Schemes Related to Increased Quantity or Quality?
AbstractUniversities are engaged in many activities; primarily, research and teaching. Many states have instituted performance measures that focus on evaluating a university's success in teaching. We suggest that multitasking may be important in this context, and we consider research outcomes after adoption. We find striking results that depend on university status. Research activity is higher at flagship institutions after the adoption of performance measures. Most of this increase in activity is with respect to the level of research funding and the number of articles produced. In contrast, research funding and the number of publications is dramatically lower at non-flagship institutions. There is some evidence that citations per publication at non-flagship institutions are higher after the adoption of performance standards. The evidence suggests that universities have become more specialized since the introduction of these programs.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Calgary in its series Working Papers with number 2009-04.
Date of creation: 23 Jan 2009
Date of revision: 29 Oct 2010
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-08-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-EDU-2009-08-16 (Education)
- NEP-INO-2009-08-16 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2009-08-16 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-LAB-2009-08-16 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-SOG-2009-08-16 (Sociology of Economics)
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- Avinash Dixit, 2002. "# Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 37(4), pages 696-727.
- Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
- Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 972-91, September.
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