In collaborative negotiation, representatives of interested parties are charged with the responsibility of developing a set of public policies that is mutually satisfactory. Although this approach has become popular in environmental negotiations, little is known about the characteristics of the outcomes that are reached. We use laboratory experiments to test whether a number of axiomatic models of bargaining can cast light on this question. As most such conflicts are multi-dimensional, we ask pairs of subjects to negotiate over two goods, with no cash side payments. We examine: whether parties with an initial endowment that is Pareto inefficient will make trades until they reach an efficient allocation; whether parties reach the Nash bargain when it coincides with or conflicts with outcomes that maximise the parties' joint payoffcs and with outcomes at which the parties' receive equal payoffs; and whether behavior varies as subjects are provided with varying amounts of information.
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Calgary in its series Working Papers with number
2008-20.
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