The Efficiency of Direct Public Involvement in Environmental Policymaking: An Experimental Test
AbstractIn collaborative negotiation, representatives of interested parties are charged with the responsibility of developing a set of public policies that is mutually satisfactory. Although this approach has become popular in environmental negotiations, little is known about the characteristics of the outcomes that are reached. We use laboratory experiments to test whether a number of axiomatic models of bargaining can cast light on this question. As most such conflicts are multi-dimensional, we ask pairs of subjects to negotiate over two goods, with no cash side payments. We examine: whether parties with an initial endowment that is Pareto inefficient will make trades until they reach an efficient allocation; whether parties reach the Nash bargain when it coincides with or conflicts with outcomes that maximise the parties' joint payoffcs and with outcomes at which the parties' receive equal payoffs; and whether behavior varies as subjects are provided with varying amounts of information.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Calgary in its series Working Papers with number 2008-20.
Date of creation: 19 Jan 2008
Date of revision: 19 Jan 2008
Other versions of this item:
- Christopher Bruce & Jeremy Clark, 2010. "The Efficiency of Direct Public Involvement in Environmental Policymaking: An Experimental Test," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 45(2), pages 157-182, February.
- Christopher Bruce & Jeremy Clark, 2008. "The Efficiency of Direct Public Involvement in Environmental Policymaking: An Experimental Test," Working Papers in Economics 08/08, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-04-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-04-15 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-ENV-2008-04-15 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2008-04-15 (Experimental Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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