The Efficiency of Direct Public Involvement in Environmental Policymaking: An Experimental Test
AbstractWe use laboratory experiments to test whether a number of axiomatic models of bargaining can predict the behavior of the parties to environmental decision making. In recognition of the multi-dimensional aspect of most public land use conflicts, we ask pairs of subjects to negotiate over two goods, without the possibility of cash side payments. We thus provide one of the first experimental tests of a prediction associated with the Edgeworth Box: that parties with an initial endowment that is Pareto inefficient will make trades until they reach a Pareto efficient allocation. We further test whether parties in particular reach the Nash bargain when it coincides with or conflicts with outcomes that maximise the partiesâ€™ joint payoffs and with outcomes at which the partiesâ€™ receive equal payoffs. Finally, the effect of providing parties with full or partial information regarding payoffs is also examined.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Calgary in its series Working Papers with number 2008-20.
Date of creation: 19 Jan 2008
Date of revision: 19 Jan 2008
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-04-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-04-15 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-ENV-2008-04-15 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2008-04-15 (Experimental Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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