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Spam - solutions and their problems

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Author Info
B. Curtis Eaton
Ian MacDonald
Laura Meriluoto

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Abstract

We analyze three potential solutions to the spamn problem - sender pays pricing, receiver pays pricing and filtering - used alone or concurrently. We find that filters alone may exacerbate the spam problem if the spammer tries to evade them by sending multiple variants of the message to each consumer. Sender pays and receiver pays prices can be effective on their own or with filtering in reducing or eliminating spam. When filtering is used in conjunction with either price the magnitude of the spam-eliminating price is unambiguously reduced for every level of filter effectiveness.

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File URL: http://econ.ucalgary.ca/sites/econ.ucalgary.ca/files/publications/Spampaper.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Calgary in its series Working Papers with number 2008-09.

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Date of creation: 07 Feb 2008
Date of revision: 07 Feb 2008
Handle: RePEc:clg:wpaper:2008-09

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Related research
Keywords: spam; filtering; email; receiver pays pricing; sender pays pricing;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, 2004. "Sender or Receiver: Who Should Pay to Exchange an Electronic Message?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(3), pages 423-447, Autumn.
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-22.


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