Trade, Tragedy and the Commons
AbstractWe develop a theory of resource management where the degree to which countries escape the tragedy of the commons, and hence the de facto property rights regime, is endogenously determined. Three forces determine success or failure in resource management: the regulator's enforcement power, the extent of harvesting capacity, and the ability of the resource to generate competitive returns without being extinguished. The model can explain heterogeneity across countries and resources in the effectiveness of resource management, and it predicts that changes in prices, population, and technology can cause transitions to better or worse management regimes. Policy analysis based on the assumption of a fixed degree of property rights protection may lead to serious error.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Calgary in its series Working Papers with number 2008-01.
Date of creation: 01 Feb 2002
Date of revision: 01 Jan 2008
resources; trade; property rights;
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