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Prevention and Dynamic Risk Adjustment Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Karen Eggleston
Randall P. Ellis
Mingshan Lu
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Risk adjustment deters selection and helps to assure fair and efficient payments among health insurers or capitated provider groups. However, since conventional risk adjustment allocates funds among insurers or regions according to current population health status, it does not reward - indeed, it penalizes - provider preventive efforts that improve population health. This prevention penalty of risk adjustment will become increasingly salient as inter-related trends converge - aging societies, chronic disease epidemics, use of market-based incentives and wider adoption of conventional risk adjustment. We develop a theoretical model of selection and prevention demonstrating this problem with conventional risk adjustment and suggesting a simple alternative that restores incentives for optimal prevention. Dynamic risk adjustment combines conventional risk adjustment with pay-for-performance for prevention.
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Calgary in its series Working Papers with number
2007-06.
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Date of creation: 26 Oct 2007Date of revision:
26 Oct 2007Handle: RePEc:clg:wpaper:2007-06Contact details of provider: Postal: 2500 University Drive N.W., Calgary, Alberta, T2N 1N4 Phone: (403) 220-5857 Fax: (403) 282-5262 Web page: http://econ.ucalgary.ca/ More information through EDIRC
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[Downloadable!]
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