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Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Fiscal Policy: an Examination of Canadian Provinces

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Author Info
Ronald D. Kneebone
Kenneth James McKenzie

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Abstract

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Calgary in its series Working Papers with number 1998-06.

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Date of creation: 01 Jan 1998
Date of revision: 01 Jan 1998
Handle: RePEc:clg:wpaper:1998-06

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Von Hagen, J., 1992. "Budgeting Procedures and Fiscal Performance in the European Communities," European Economy - Economic Papers 96, Commission of the EC, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN).
  2. Alesina, Alberto F & Cohen, Gerald D & Roubini, Nouriel, 1992. "Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies," CEPR Discussion Papers 608, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Kenneth Rogoff, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," NBER Working Papers 2428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Nordhaus, William D, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(2), pages 169-90, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Breusch, T S & Pagan, A R, 1980. "The Lagrange Multiplier Test and Its Applications to Model Specification in Econometrics," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(1), pages 239-53, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Roubini, Nouriel & Sachs, Jeffrey D., 1989. "Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 903-933, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Marco Bonomo & Cristina Terra, 2008. "Political Business Cycles through Lobbying," THEMA Working Papers 2008-18, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
  2. Marcela Eslava, 2006. "The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy: Survey," RES Working Papers 4487, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  3. J. Ferris & Soo-Bin Park & Stanley Winer, 2008. "Studying the role of political competition in the evolution of government size over long horizons," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 369-401, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Bonomo, Marco Antônio Cesar & Terra, Maria Cristina T., 2005. "Special Interests and Political Business Cycles," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 597, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  5. Picci, Lucio & Golden, Miriam, 2007. "Pork Barrel Politics in Postwar Italy, 1953–1994," MPRA Paper 5626, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. J. Stephen Ferris & Soo-Bin Park & Stanley L. Winer, 2005. "Political Competition and Convergence to Fundamentals: With Application to the Politcal Business Cycle and the Size of the Public Sector," Carleton Economic Papers 05-09, Carleton University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Konstantinos Angelopoulos & George Economides & Pantelis Kammas, 2009. "Do political incentives matter for tax policies? Ideology, opportunism and the tax structure," Working Papers 2009_12, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow. [Downloadable!]
  8. Dahlberg, Matz & Mörk, Eva, 2008. "Is there an election cycle in public employment? Separating time effects from election year effects," Working Paper Series 2008:3, IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Stephen Ferris & Marcel Voia, 2008. "What determines the length of a typical Canadian parliamentary government?," Carleton Economic Papers 08-06, Carleton University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. J Stephen Ferris & Soo-Bin ParkFF & Stanley L. Winer, 2006. "Political Competition and Convergence to Fundamentals: With Application to the Political Business Cycle and the Size of Government," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  11. Allan Drazen & Marcela Eslava, 2006. "Pork Barrel Cycles," NBER Working Papers 12190, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Allan Drazen & Marcela Eslava, 2005. "Electoral Manipulation via Expenditure Composition: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 11085, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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