Economic Reforms and Political Constraints on the Time Inconsistency of Gradual Sequencing
AbstractThis paper presents a model portraying a country in a political deadlock about reform proposals that hurt strongly organized interest groups. We show that, under sorne circumstances (no ability to precommit, veto power by interest groups), only far reaching reforms (even if quite costly) have hope of success. The model intends to explain why in recent years several Latin American countries have gone for radical reform.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers with number 736.
Date of creation: 01 Jul 1995
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Web page: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/
Other versions of this item:
- Martinelli, César & Tommasi, Mariano, . "Economic reforms and political constraints: on the time inconsistency of gradual sequencing," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/3916, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
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- Rodrik, Dani, 1989.
"Promises, Promises: Credible Policy Reform via Signalling,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(397), pages 756-72, September.
- Dani Rodrik, 1988. "Promises, Promises: Credible Policy Reform via Signaling," NBER Working Papers 2600, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dewatripont, Mathias & Roland, Gerard, 1995.
"The Design of Reform Packages under Uncertainty,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1207-23, December.
- Mathias Dewatripont & Gérard Roland, 1995. "The design of reform packages under uncertainty," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9607, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Dewatripont, Mathias & Roland, Gérard, 1993. "The Design of Reform Packages Under Uncertainty," CEPR Discussion Papers 860, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Michael Mussa, 1982. "Government Policy and the Adjustment Process," NBER Chapters, in: Import Competition and Response, pages 73-122 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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